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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we introduce a new family of rank-dependent measures of inequality and social welfare 
consistent with the Equality of Opportunity (EOp) principle. The proposed framework can be used to 
measure long-term as well as short-term EOp, depending on whether we let permanent income or 
snapshots of income form the basis of the analysis. Further, it allows for both an ex-ante and an ex-
post approach to EOp. There is long-term ex-post inequality of opportunity if individuals who exert 
the same effort have different permanent incomes. In comparison, the ex-ante approach focuses on 
differences in the expected permanent income between groups of individuals with identical 
circumstances. To demonstrate the empirical relevance of a long-run perspective on EOp, we exploit a 
unique panel data from Norway on individuals’ incomes over their working lifespan. This allows us to 
examine how well analysis of opportunity inequality based on snapshots of income approximate the 
results based on permanent income.  
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1. Introduction  
Over the last decades, increasing discontent has been expressed with distributional analysis based on 
observations of income for a single year. The reason is twofold: (i) transitory income components, and 
(ii) life-cycle variation in income. On the one hand, inequality in annual income is expected to 
overestimate the extent of long-term income inequality, since idiosyncratic shocks to income average 
out over time. On the other hand, measuring income early (late) in individuals' working lifespan is 
expected to understate (overstate) long-term income inequality, as individuals with high permanent 
income tend to be those with high income growth. This has led to a spur of research on inequality and 
social welfare in long-term or permanent income according to the Equality of Outcome (EO) 
principle.1  
At the same time, a large and growing literature has addressed the question: what exactly 
should be equalized? Egalitarian theories of justice, especially after Sen’s (1980, 1985, 1992) 
influential work, emphasize equality of opportunity (EOp) rather than equality of income. The 
distinction between functionings and capabilities made by Sen is closely related to the EOp concept, 
although the notion of individual responsibility plays a different role in Sen (1980, 1985, 1992) than in 
the theories of Dworkin (1981,a,b), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989) and Roemer (1993).2 Following 
Roemer (1993, 1998) and Fleurbaey (1995), economists have explored different ways of evaluating 
income distributions according to the EOp principle. However, snapshots of income still form the 
basis of EOp analyses.3 The aim of this paper is to bridge these two strands of the literature by 
introducing and applying a general framework for evaluating long-term income distributions 
according to the EOp principle.  
 We follow the basic idea of the EOp literature closely in assuming that individuals' outcomes 
arise from two different types of variables: variables which they should not be held responsible for 
(circumstances), and variables which belong to the sphere of individuals' responsibility (effort). Once 
this basic partition has been made, the concept of EOp can be decomposed into two distinct ethical 
principles: the Compensation Principle, which states that differences in outcomes due to 
circumstances are ethically unacceptable and should be compensated, and the Reward Principle, 
which states that differences due to effort are to be considered ethically acceptable and do not justify 
any redistribution. 
 The existing literature on the measurement of opportunity inequality has explored two main 
approaches to measure opportunity inequality,4 namely the ex-ante and the ex-post approach.5 The 
two approaches rely on different definitions of EOp and embody the above ethical principles in 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Shorrocks (1978), Chakravarty et al. (1985), Maasoumi and Trede (2001), and Aaberge and Mogstad (2009).  
2 See Fleurbaey (2009) for a discussion.  
3 A notable exception is Bourguignon et al. (2007), which will be discussed in detail below.  
4 See, among others, Peragine (2002, 2004a,b), Bourguignon et al. (2003), Dardanoni et al. (2006), Lefranc et al. (2006), 
Ferreira and Guignoux (2008), Peragine and Serlenga (2008) and Checchi and Peragine (2009). 
5 Notice that the ex ante and the ex post approaches can be incompatible (see Fleurbaey and Peragine, 2010). 
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different ways. According to the ex-ante approach, there is equality of opportunity if the set of 
opportunities is the same for all individuals, regardless of their circumstances. Thus, inequality of 
opportunity is reduced if inequality between individual opportunity sets decreases. This approach 
partitions the population into different types, where each type is formed by individuals endowed with 
the same set of circumstances. The type-specific outcome distribution is interpreted as the opportunity 
set of individuals with the same circumstances. Accordingly, it focuses on inequality between types, 
and is neutral with respect to inequality within types.6 In comparison, the ex-post approach states that 
there is equality of opportunity if all those who exert the same effort have the same outcome. 
Inequality of opportunity decreases if outcome inequality decreases among individuals with the same 
degree of effort. The ex post approach emphasizes inequalities within groups of individuals at the 
same effort levels, so-called tranches. Differences between tranches are interpreted as due to 
individual effort, and are considered as ethical acceptable.7   
                                                
The approaches discussed above have been formulated in a static context, where current 
incomes (or some other snapshot of individual advantage) form the basis of the analysis. In this paper, 
we propose a framework that can be used to measure short-term or long-term EOp, depending on 
whether we let snapshots of income or permanent income form the basis. Our framework allows for 
both an ex-ante and an ex-post approach to EOp. There is long-term ex-post inequality of opportunity 
if individuals who exert the same effort have different permanent incomes. In comparison, the ex-ante 
approach focuses on the expected permanent income for groups of individuals with identical 
circumstances. Hence, the ex-ante approach pays attention to inequalities in expected permanent 
income between different types of individuals. 
Measuring long-term EOp requires aggregation in two steps. The first step consists of 
aggregating the income stream of each individual into an interpersonal comparable measure of 
permanent income. To this end, we follow Aaberge and Mogstad (2009) in using a measure of 
permanent income which incorporates the costs of and constraints on making inter-period income 
transfers. The second step consists of aggregating individuals’ permanent incomes into EOp measures 
of social welfare and inequality. Specifically, we employ an axiomatic approach to justify the 
introduction of a generalized family of rank-dependent measures of ex post as well as ex ante 
opportunity inequality and social welfare. When measuring short term EOp, the measures of 
opportunity and social welfare are simply applied to the distributions of annual income.   
The gain in studying long-run EOp is twofold. First of all, by focusing on the distribution of 
permanent income, we eliminate life-cycle bias in opportunity inequality. In particular, we overcome 
the problem of separating out how much of the life-cycle variation in annual income that is due to 
circumstances, and how much that is due to effort. Secondly, by letting permanent income form the 
 
6This is the approach proposed by van de Gaer (1993) and Peragine (2004a) and used by Ferreira and Guignoux (2008) and 
Lefranc et al. (2006). 
7 This is the approach proposed by Roemer (1993, 1998), and used by Roemer et al. (2003)  and Aaberge and Colombino 
(2010).  Peragine (2002, 2004b) and Checchi and Peragine (2010) explore both the ex ante and the ex post approaches. 
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basis for the EOp analysis, we eliminate opportunity inequality due to idiosyncratic shocks to income. 
This can be important since such transitory income components average out over time, and therefore 
do not call for compensation according to the Compensation Principle. The long-term perspective on 
EOp can also be important from a policy perspective, by highlighting that inequality opportunities 
may accumulate over time, if (dis)advantages beget (dis)advantages. Moreover, it allows for the 
possibility that groups viewed as (dis)advantaged based on snapshots of income may change positions 
over time. In such cases, policies that minimize snapshots of opportunity inequality may deviate from 
those optimizing equality of opportunity in long-term income. 
 To demonstrate the empirical relevance of our EOp framework, we exploit a unique panel data 
set from Norway on individuals’ incomes over their working lifespan. This allows us to examine how 
well analyses of inequality and social welfare based on snapshots of income approximate the results 
based on long-term income. Further, we investigate how sensitive distributional comparisons between 
the EOp and the EO principle of justice are to the choice of accounting period of income. Finally, we 
assess to what extent the ex-ante and the ex-post approaches yield different pictures of opportunity 
inequality and social welfare.  
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 deals with the problem of aggregating (permanent or 
snapshots of) income across individuals into measures of (long-term or short-term) income inequality 
and social welfare. Section 3 introduces a new family of rank-dependent measures of ex-ante and ex-
post opportunity inequality and social welfare, after which we clarify the differences between our 
framework and the method for measuring long-term EOp proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007). 
Section 4 reports the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.  
2 Rank-dependent measures of inequality and social 
welfare 
Empirical analyses of inequality in income distributions are conventionally based on the Lorenz curve 
and associated summary measures of inequality, which means that concern is directed towards income 
shares without taking account of differences in mean incomes. To summarize the information content 
of the Lorenz curve and to achieve rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves, the standard approach is to 
employ the Gini coefficient in combination with one or two inequality measures from the Atkinson 
family or the Theil family. However, since they have distinct theoretical foundations, it is difficult to 
evaluate their capacity as complementary measures of inequality. An alternative approach, which will 
be chosen in this paper, is to use measures of inequality which can be shown to have a common 
theoretical justification as criteria for ranking Lorenz curves.  
The Lorenz curve L for a cumulative income distribution F with mean μ is defined by 
(2.1) −= v 1
0
1L( v ) F ( t )dt , 0 v 1
μ
≤ ≤ ,  
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where { }1( ) inf : ( )F t x F x− = t≥  is the left inverse of F. Thus, the Lorenz curve L(v) shows the share 
of total income received by the poorest 100 v per cent of the population. Note that F can either be a 
discrete or a continuous distribution function. Although the former is what we actually observe, the 
latter often allows simpler derivation of theoretical results and is a valid large sample approximation. 
Below F will be assumed to be a continuous distribution function. 
 
Under the restriction of equal mean incomes, the problem of ranking Lorenz curves formally 
corresponds to the problem of choosing between uncertain prospects. This relationship has been 
utilized by, for example, Atkinson (1970) to characterize the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz 
curves in the case of distributions with equal mean incomes. This was motivated by the fact that in 
cases of equal mean incomes, the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves is equivalent to second-
degree stochastic dominance, which means that the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves obeys 
the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. To perform inequality comparisons with Lorenz curves we can 
either limit our attention to distributions with equal means, or alternatively simply abandon the 
assumption of equal means and consider distributions of relative incomes.8 The latter approach 
normally forms the basis of empirical studies of income inequality and will be used in this paper. 
 Let L denote the family of Lorenz curves, and let a social planner’s ranking of members of L  
be represented by a preference ordering  , which will be assumed to satisfy the following basic 
axioms:  
 
Axiom 1 (Order).   is a transitive and complete ordering on L. 
Axiom 2 (Dominance). Let  If  for all  then L , L1 2 ∈L . (v)L(v)L 21 ≥ [0,1v∈ ] L L1 2 .  
Axiom 3 (Continuity). For each  the sets L ,∈L { }L : L L* *∈L   and { }L : L L* *∈L   are closed 
(w.r.t. L1-norm). 
 
Given the above continuity and dominance assumptions for the ordering   , Aaberge (2001) 
demonstrated that the following axiom, 
 
Axiom 4 (Independence). Let L1, L2 and L3 be members of L and let [ ]α ∈ 0,1 .  Then 21 LL   implies 
1 3 2(1 ) (1 )L L Lα α α α+ − + − 3L
                                                
, 
 
 
8 See e.g. Smith's (1979) discussion of necessities and Sen's (1992) discussion of relative deprivation. 
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characterizes the rank-dependent family of inequality measures ,EO pJ  defined by
9  
(2.2) 
1 1
1
,
0 0
1( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )−= + = − EO pJ L L v dp v p v F v dvμ , 
where subscript EO refers to inequality of outcomes, and subscript p refers to a positive and non-
increasing weight-function defined on the unit interval such that ( ) 1= p v dv  and =p( 1) 0 . The latter 
condition ensures that  ,EO pJ  has the unit interval as its range. Note that p can be interpreted as a 
preference function of a social planner who assigns weights to the incomes of the individuals in 
accordance with their rank in the income distribution. Therefore, the functional form of p reveals the 
attitude towards inequality of a social planner who employs pJ  to judge between Lorenz curves.  
 As was recognized by Ebert (1987), the justification of the social welfare function associated 
with ,EO pJ   can be made in terms of value judgement of the trade-off between the mean and 
(in)equality in the distribution of income  
(2.3)   , 
1
1
0
1 −= − = EO,p EO,pW ( J ) p( v )F ( vμ )dv
where  can be interpreted as the equally distributed (equivalent) level of income. Yaari (1988) 
provides an alternative axiomatic justification for using the latter term of (2.3) as a criterion for 
ranking distribution functions F, rather than as a trade-off between mean and equality. Note that the 
normative justification for the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality
EO,pW
pJ  is analogous to the 
justification for Atkinson’s expected utility type of inequality measures. The essential differences 
between these two approaches for measuring inequality and social welfare arise from the 
independence axioms. Whilst the expected utility independence axiom requires that the ordering of 
distributions of individual welfare is invariant with respect to identical mixing of the distributions 
being compared, the rank-dependent independence axiom requires that the ordering is invariant with 
respect to identical mixing of Lorenz curves (or identical mixing of the inverses of distributions) being 
compared. For further discussion, see Yaari (1988) and Aaberge (2001).  
 When specifying 2 1p( v ) ( v )= − , it follows that ,EO pJ  becomes equal to the Gini coefficient. 
To complement the information provided by the Gini coefficient, it appears attractive to use members 
of the rank-dependent family  where 1 2=p k , ,...,= kk EO,C J ,
 
                                                 
9 Mehran (1976) introduced an alternative version of (2.2) based on descriptive arguments. For alternative motivations of the 
JP-family and various subfamilies we refer to Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Ben Porath and 
Gilboa (1994), and Aaberge (2000, 2007). 
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(2.4)   ( )1
1
1 2
1
k k
log v, k
p ( v ) k v , k , ,....
k
−
− =
= 
− =
− 3
   
 
As indicated by Aaberge (2000, 2007), the family { }: 1,2,...kC k =  uniquely determines the Lorenz 
curve . Thus, by restricting to this family of inequality measures no information is lost. However, in 
applied work it is for practical reasons convenient to employ a few measures of inequality. To this 
end, Aaberge (2007) draws on standard statistical practice to justify the use of C1 (the Bonferroni 
coefficient), C2 (the Gini coefficient) and C3 as a basis for summarizing the inequality information in 
an income distribution, and the associated social welfare functions W1, W2 and W3 to assess the trade-
off between efficiency and (in)equality. Moreover, these three measures of inequality also prove to 
complement each other with regard to sensitivity to transfers at the lower, the central and the upper 
part of the income distribution.  
L
3 Generalized families of rank-dependent measures of  
opportunity inequality and social welfare 
This section introduces the generalized family of rank-dependent measures of ex post as well as ex 
ante opportunity inequality and social welfare. The proposed framework is valid for measuring short-
term as well as long-term EOp, depending on whether we let snapshots of income or permanent 
income form the basis of the analysis. But first, we will discuss the setup. 
3.1 The setup 
We consider a continuum of individuals. Individuals are described by a list of factors, which can be 
partitioned into two different classes: factors beyond the individual control, represented by a person's 
vector of circumstances c  belonging to an abstract and finite set ; and factors for 
which the individual is fully responsible, represented by a scalar variable
{ m1 c,,cΩ =
e
}
10  (effort), . 
We observe but not . Assume that the circumstances of an individual consist of factors that are 
constant over time, such as family background.
+ℜ⊆Θ∈e
c e
11  
By partitioning the population into m subpopulations, each representing a class identified by 
variable c , we call “type” i  the set of individuals whose set of circumstances is . Within type , 
there will be a cumulative distribution of (permanent or period-specific) income 
ic
i
i
F  with mean iμ  and 
a population share denoted by  such that iq
1
( ) ( )
m
i i
i
F x q F
=
= x
                                                
, where .  A second partition is 
=
=m i
i 1
q 1
 
10 In the analysis it could equally well be represented as a vector.  
11 The same assumption is made by Bourguignon et al. (2007). 
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based on the responsibility e . For all degrees of responsibility  we call tranche  the set of 
individuals whose responsibility level is equal to e . 
Θ∈e
g
e
Let the permanent income be defined as y = g(c,e), where  is a “production function” that 
describes the relationship between an individual’s permanent income and her effort and circumstances. 
We do not know the form of the function g ; we know, however, that it is increasing in e and the same 
for all individuals. Roemer (1993, 1998) suggests taking the quantile of the effort distribution of the 
type an individual belongs to as an inter-type comparable measure of effort, which due to the 
monotonicity of the income function, will correspond to the quantile in the income distribution of the 
type. We adopt this solution and hence we say that all individuals at the s quantile of their respective 
type income distributions have the same effort. In the analysis of long-term EOp, we define the 
tranche s as the subset of individuals whose permanent incomes 1 11 2), ( ),..., m
1( )(F s F s F− − s−  are at the ths  
quantile of their respective type permanent income distributions. 
As discussed above, using current income to measure income inequality raises two problems: 
(i) transitory income components, and (ii) life-cycle variation in income. In particular, these problems 
might lead to a distorted assessment of opportunity inequality. To see this, suppose we define tranche 
s as the subset of individuals whose period-specific incomes 1 1 1( ),..., ( )m1 2( ),F s F s F s
− − −  are at the ths  
quantile of their respective type period-specific income distributions. Let the individual income of 
period t be defined as 
(3.1) yt = ft (c,et ,ut)  
where ft is a time-specific “production function” that relates an individual's income of period t to 
circumstances c, (accumulated) effort , and idiosyncratic shocks to income . We observe c but 
not  or . Furthermore, we assume that the shape of the function ft is unknown; we only know that 
it is increasing in and the same for all individuals.  
te tu
te tu
te
Note that (3.1) departs from the standard framework used in static analysis of opportunity 
inequality in two ways. First, it distinguishes between two types of factors that are outside the 
individual responsibility; circumstances c that are constant over time, and idiosyncratic factors  
that are time-varying but assumed to average out over time. Given the circumstances c at birth, it is 
impossible to disentangle the effect of  and the effect of . Second, (3.1) acknowledges that the 
time-specific production function ft may differ from the production function of lifetime income g, 
reflecting that the effects of circumstances and effort may vary over the life-cycle. For both these 
reasons, the quantiles of period-specific income distributions of each type can in general not be 
considered inter-type comparable measures of effort. In the empirical analysis, we will examine how 
tu
te tu
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well analysis of opportunity inequality based on period-specific income approximates the results based 
on permanent income.  
 
3.2 Ex post approach 
Let 1 1 11 2 mF ( s ) F ( s ) ... F ( s )
− − −≤ ≤ ≤    be the ordering of incomes 1 1 11 2( ), ( ),..., ( )mF s F s F s− − −  across types of 
tranche s. Since the type-specific income distributions might intersect, note that the type ordering by 
income might change across quantiles; i.e. 1kF ( s )
−  and 1kF ( v−
i
s )
=
=
)
1
j
j iq ( s ) j jb ( s ) 1 a (= −
 might represent different types. 
Accordingly, the proportion of people associated with the lowest income, the second lowest income, 
etc. might change across quantiles.  Thus, let  be the population share associated with the 
individual having rank i at tranche s.  Moreover, let  and . 
iq ( s )
a ( s )
The quantile-specific mean ( s )μ and EOp Lorenz curve are defined by  ⋅EOpL ( ;s )
 
(3.2)      1 1
1 1
m m
i i i i
i i
( s ) q ( s )F ( s ) q F ( s )μ − −
= =
= = 
 
and 
(3.3)   
1
1 1 2 0 1
−
=
= =
 j i i
i
EOp j
q ( s )F ( s )
L ( a ( s );s ) , j , ,...,m, s .
( s )μ
≤ ≤  
 
Inserting (3.2) and (3.3) in (2.2) yields the following family of quantile-specific rank-dependent 
measures of inequality of opportunity  
 
(3.4)   1
1
11 −
=
= −  mEOp,p j j j
j
J ( s ) q ( s )p( a ( s ))F ( s )
( s )μ
,  
 
where p satisfies the normalization condition . Thus, 
1 1
1
= =
= = m mj j j j
j j
q ( s )p( a ( s )) q p( a ) EOp,pJ ( s )
,p
 
measures income inequality due to different circumstances for those who belong to tranche s and thus 
have exerted the same degree of effort. According to the Compensation Principle,  EOpJ ( s )  can be 
interpreted as the inequality of opportunity in tranche s.  
In order to define an overall measure of opportunity inequality, a method for aggregating the 
tranche-specific inequality measures is required. Treating inequality between tranches as ethically 
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acceptable, we can aggregate across the tranche-specific inequality measures to obtain the following 
family of rank-dependent measures of overall inequality of opportunity   
 
(3.5)     . 
1
0
= EOp,p EOp,pJ J ( s )ds
 
Thus, inequality of opportunity decreases if outcome inequality decreases among the individuals with 
the same degree of effort. The social welfare function associated with is given by EOp,pJ
 
(3.6)     1= −EOp,p EOp,pW ( J )μ  
 
where 
1
1
0
i iF ( t )dtμ −=   and 1
10 =
= = m i i
i
( s )ds qμ μ μ .  
Note that ep  defined by  
 
 
(3.7)     1
1 1
0 1 2

=
= 
=
e j
, j
q ( s )p ( a ( s ))
, j , ,...,m
 
 
represents the upper limit of inequality aversion exhibited by the family of non-increasing weight 
functions p. By inserting (3.7) in (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) we get 
(3.8)    
11
111 1
−
−
≤ ≤
= − = −
 ii m
EOp,e
min F ( s )F ( s )J ( s )
( s ) ( s )μ μ , 
 
 
(3.9)     
11
1
0
1
−
≤ ≤
= −  ii mEOp,e min F ( s )J d( s )μ s  
 
and 
 
(3.10)     
11
1
0
−
≤ ≤
=  ii mEOp,e min F ( s )W d( s )μ μ s .  
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By inserting the specification 
=
−
=

j
j m
i i
i 1
( 1 a ( s ))
p( a ( s ))
q b
where j jb 1 a= −  in (3.4) and (3.5), we get the 
Gini version of  EOp,pJ ( s )  defined by 
 
(3.11)    
1
1
1
1
−
=
=
= −


m
j j i
j
EOp m
j j
j
q ( s )b ( s )F ( s )
G ( s )
( s ) q bμ
, 
 
and 
 
(3.12)    
1 1
1
10
0
1
1
−
=
=
    
= = −

 
m
i
j j
j
EOp EOp m
j j
j
F ( s )q ( s )b ( s ) ds
( s )
G G ( s )ds
q b
μ
  
3.3 Relationship between outcome inequality and ex post 
opportunity inequality 
An appropriate decomposition method for inequality of outcome with respect to inequality of 
opportunity and inequality of effort should satisfy the following conditions: 
(i) If there is complete EOp, i.e. =EOp,pJ 0 , then EO,pJ  measures inequality of effort. 
(ii) If every individual have exerted the same degree of effort, i.e.  =( s )μ μ  for all s, then 
EO,pJ  measures inequality of opportunity, i.e., =EO,p EOp,pJ J . 
Inserting for the type-specific decomposition of the outcome distribution F; i.e. 
1
( ) ( )
m
i i
i
F x q F
=
= x , in 
(2.2) yields 
(3.13) − −
=
 
= −    
1 m
1 1
EO,p j j j
j 10
1J 1 q p( F( F ( s )))F ( s ) ds
μ
. 
Next, by ordering types by increasing income for each tranche and by observing that 
, we get the following alternative expression for (3.13) −=  1j ja ( s ) F( F ( s ))
(3.14) −
=
 
= −     
1 m
1
EO,p j j j
j 10
1J 1 q ( s )p( a ( s ))F ( s ) ds
μ
. 
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Inserting for (3.4) in (3.14) yields 
(3.15) = − − = + − − 1 1EO,p EOp,p EOp,p EOp,p
0 0
1 ( s )J 1 ( s )(1 J ( s ))ds J (1 )(1 J ( s ))dsμμ
μ μ
. 
It follows immediately from (3.15) that =( s )μ μ  for all s implies that =EO,p EOp,pJ J
EOp
, which means 
that condition (ii) is fulfilled. When there is complete equality of opportunity, i.e. =,pJ ( s ) 0  for all 
s, then EOp,pJ  defined by (3.15) becomes a measure of inequality of effort as required by condition (i). 
Accordingly, the decomposition (3.15) satisfies the requirements (i) and (ii). Note that the latter term 
of the decomposition (3.15) can be considered as a measure of inequality of effort, where the 
contribution from each tranche depends on the tranche-specific inequality of opportunity. 
 The decomposition (3.15) characterizes the relationship between EO and ex-post EOP, and 
demonstrates that it is meaningful to treat EOp,pJ  as a share of EO,pJ . Section 4 provides empirical 
estimates of the share of outcome inequality that is opportunity inequality, based on permanent as well 
as current incomes.  
3.4 Ex ante approach 
The ex ante approach focuses attention on the differences in the outcome prospects for individuals 
with identical circumstances. Accordingly, it focuses on inequality between types, and is instead 
neutral with respect to inequality within types. Hence, the ex ante approach is more focused on 
inequalities between social groups. Referring to the Principle of Utilitarian Reward introduced by 
Fleurbaey (2008), which states the social irrelevance of inequalities due to differences in effort, this 
implies that any equalizing transfer with identical circumstances should not change income inequality 
or social welfare, whatever the effort level of the persons involved. This means that an ex ante 
approach for measuring inequality of opportunity will solely depend on the type-specific mean 
incomes. 
 Assume that the type-specific means can be ordered in the following way 1 2 m...μ μ μ≤ ≤ ≤  
and that  is associated withiq iμ . Now consider a hypothetical distribution where every individual of 
type i is assumed to receive the same income equal to the type-specific mean iμ . In this case, the type-
specific distributions are defined by  
 
(3.16)     
0
1
i
i
i
, x
F ( x )
, x
μ
μ
∗
<
=  ≥
, i=1,2,…,m, 
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whereas the distribution function of the society is defined by ∗ = ∗ i iF ( x ) q F ( x ) , and the associated 
Lorenz curve12 is defined by  
(3.17)     1
1
1 2
j
i i
i
j m
i i
i
q
L ( a ) , j , ,...,m.
q
μ
μ
∗ =
=
= =


  
Moreover, the associated rank-dependent family of inequality measures is defined by  
(3.18)     1
1
1 =∗
=
= −

p
m
j j j
j
EO ,p m
j j
j
q p( a )
J
q p( a )
μ
μ
  . 
The ∗
pEO ,p
J   measure captures the inequality between types, which can be interpreted as ex ante 
inequality of opportunity. When p represents the Gini weight function, then pJ
∗  is given by  
(3.19)     1
1
1 =∗
=
= −

p
m
j j j
j
EO m
j j
j
q b
G
q b
μ
μ
. 
The welfare function associated with ∗
pEO ,p
J  is defined by  
(3.20)    1
1
1 =∗ ∗
=
= − =

p p
m
j j j
j
EO ,p EO ,p m
j j
j
q p( a )
W ( J )
q p( a )
μ
μ  
By inserting (3.7) in (3.18) and (3.20) we get 
 
(3.20)     11∗ ≤ ≤= −
p
ii m
EO ,e
min
J
μ
μ
 
and 
 
(3.21)     
1
∗
≤ ≤
=
pEO ,e ii m
W min μ . 
 
Note that ∗
pEO ,e
W  corresponds to the EOp welfare function introduced by Roemer (1993, 1998) , when 
applied to snapshots of income. When  iμ  represents the mean permanent income of type i, then 
∗
pEO ,e
W  coincides with the EOp welfare function introduced by Bourguignon et al. (2007), if and only if 
                                                 
12 The partial ordering based on the Lorenz curve below was characterized in Peragine (2002).  
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iμ  can be expressed as weighted average of the period-specific type mean incomes. As shown by 
Aaberge and Mogstad (2009), iμ can be given such a representation only under the assumption of a 
perfect capital market, that is, when there are no liquidity constraints and the real interests on 
borrowing and savings are equal. 
3.5 Relationship with previous approaches 
In a pioneering paper, Bourguignon et al. (2007) propose an alternative approach for measuring long-
term EOp, which is in line with an ex ante perspective. First, individuals are divided into types who 
are homogeneous with respect to exogenous circumstances at a given point in time, where the income 
distributions represent the opportunity set of individuals belonging to specific type in a given period. 
Second, for each type the opportunity sets are aggregated across time periods to obtain the long-tern 
opportunity sets. Finally, the distribution of long-term opportunity sets across types is evaluated. 
Bourguignon et al. (2007) discuss two different methods to do so.    
 As a first methodology, Bourguignon et al. (2007, p. 243) define EOp as follow: there is EOp 
if, in each period, there is not dominance between types. Hence, in each period of time, there should be 
equality or, as a weaker definition, non-dominance of opportunity sets. This can be seen as the natural 
extension of the approach used by Lefranc et al (2006) and Peragine and Serlenga (2008) to a long-
term perspective. As second methodology, Bourguignon et al. (2007) propose a long-term extension of 
the utilitarian version of EOp, according to which there is EOp if the long-term expected value of all 
types are equal. They first use a utilitarian evaluation function which evaluates the opportunity set of 
each type at a given period  by its mean t itμ .  Next, they introduce a time aggregator ( )t itφ μ , in 
order to obtain an expression of  the long-term value of the opportunity set. Finally, to evaluate the 
distribution of long-term opportunity sets, they use the following social welfare function: 
  
( ) min t iti
T
W F dtφ μ=  .  
 
As demonstrated above, we take a different approach to long-term EOp. In our methodology, 
the aggregation over time is performed for each individual. This allows us to be specific with respect 
to the underlying model of intertemporal choice that underlies the construction of the distribution of 
long-term income. Our approach is also more general in the sense that it allows both an ex ante and an 
ex post approach to long-term EOp. Moreover, both in the ex ante and in the ex post approach, our 
framework allows for different attitudes towards inequality aversion.  
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4 Empirical analysis 
This section implements the proposed framework for measuring opportunity inequality and social 
welfare, using panel data from Norway on individual income over the working lifespan.  
 
Data. Our empirical analysis utilizes several register databases provided by Statistics Norway. The 
data include a rich longitudinal dataset containing records for every Norwegian from 1967 to 2006. 
The variables captured in this dataset include individual demographic information (sex, year and 
municipality of birth, number of siblings) and socio-economic data (income and education). 
Importantly, the dataset includes personal identifiers, allowing us to link children to their parents. Our 
income measure is defined in close agreements with international recommendations (see Expert Group 
on Household Income Statistics, 2001), and incorporates annual wages, capital income, and all public 
cash transfers. We use the consumer price index to make earnings and incomes from different periods 
comparable. Throughout this paper we focus on individual income, because our family data does not 
allow us to link spouses living in cohabitation. Nor can we identify married spouses before the mid 
1970s. Therefore, we cannot construct a measure of family or household income.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on the 1942-1944 cohorts in order to ensure availability of data 
on income for more or less the entire working lifespan. In particular, these cohorts are between 23 and 
25 years old in 1967 and between 62 and 64 in 2006.13 Our analytical sample is restricted to males, 
given their role of breadwinner and primary wage-earner for these cohorts. Also, we exclude 
individuals whose information on annual income is missing. Finally, we drop observations where 
information on parents is missing. The final sample used in the analysis consists of 26 090 individuals.  
 
Permanent income. As a measure of permanent income, we follow Aaberge and Mogstad (2009) in 
defining permanent income as the minimum annual expenditure an individual would need in order to 
be as well off as he could be by undertaking inter-period income transfers. To derive an interpersonal 
comparable measure of permanent income, they follow standard practice in assuming that inter-period 
income transfers are carried out in accordance with an intertemporal utility function that is common to 
all individuals. The common utility function, which is to be determined by the social planner based on 
his ethical value judgement, contains within it interpersonal comparability of both welfare levels and 
welfare differences, and can be viewed as a normative standard where individuals are treated 
symmetrically.14 Specifically, the social planner is assumed to employ the conventional discounted 
utility model with perfect foresight, where preferences are intertemporal separable and additive. 
                                                 
13 Note that people are eligible for early retirement when they have become 62 years old. See Aaberge and Mogstad (2010) 
and Almås et al. (2010) for analyses of the time trends in inequality of outcome in Norway.   
14  The use of a common utility function is well-established in the public economic literature and has e.g. been proposed by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Hammond (1991). It also forms the basis for the definition and measurement of a money-
metric measure of utility in for example King (1983) and Aaberge et al. (2004).   
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The measure of permanent income proposed by Aaberge and Mogstad (2009) is compatible 
with a rather general structure on intertemporal preference and the credit market. Moreover, it can be 
considered as a money-metric measure of the utility level associated with the income stream for a 
given individual. In addition, it encompasses much used measures of permanent income, such as the 
average income and the annuity value of an income stream,15 depending on the assumptions made 
about the intertemporal preferences and the credit market. In contrast to studies using average income 
or the annuity income as the permanent income, we allow for individual-specific interest rates on 
borrowing and savings in individuals’ budget constraint. Thus, our measure of permanent income 
incorporates the cost of making inter-period income transfers, and hence account for the utility loss 
that may be associated with income fluctuations. The annual real interest rates on borrowing and 
savings are computed from Norwegian official statistics on interest rates on loans and deposits in 
commercial banks over the period 1967-2006.  
We further assume that the instantaneous utility term of the intertemporal utility function 
belongs to the Bergson family, which is a much used specification of the instantaneous utility function 
in intertemporal choice theory (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000). In the results displayed below, we have 
set the rate of time preferences equal to 2 percent, which is approximately the same as the average real 
interest rates on borrowing and savings during the period of study. Finally, the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution is assumed to be equal to 0.5, which is in the mid range of the estimates reported in 
previous research. In any case, the estimated inequality and social welfare are quite robust to 
substantial changes in the preference parameters.16 
 
Circumstances and types. How to define the exact set of individual circumstances is a controversial 
question. Besides, in empirical work, observing the entire set of circumstances is clearly out of reach. 
In this paper, we focus on the dependence of individual opportunity on a restricted set of 
circumstances relating to family background. The role of families in determining socio-economic 
outcomes has been extensively discussed in economics as well as from other scientific perspectives. 
Parents influence their children via several channels: investment in their children’s education, 
transmission of cultural values and social skills, and genetic endowments. As argued by Roemer 
(1998) and others, equality of opportunity requires compensating the influence of family background 
on individual outcomes, as it lies beyond individual responsibility and choice.   
                                                 
15 In Shorrocks (1978) as well as in most subsequent empirical studies of long-term inequality and income mobility according 
to the EOp principle, the average income is used as an approximation for permanent income. 
16 There is no consensus on the exact value of the intertemporal elasiticity of substitution. On the one hand, consistency of 
calibrated dynamic macroeconomic models with aggregate data requires relatively large value of this parameter. For 
example, Kydland and Prescott (1982) calibrated this value to be around 0.66. On the other hand, direct estimates of this 
parameter seem to suggest considerably lower values (see e.g. Hall, 1988). As a robustness check, we have used values of the 
intertemporal elasiticity ranging from .1 to 1.0, and values of the rate of time preferences ranging from 0 to .1. It is reassuring 
to find that our estimates of the measures of inequality and social welfare are quite robust to the changes in the preference 
parameters. The results are available on request.  
 16
A large body of empirical research shows a strong degree of intergenerational transmission, as 
parental characteristics like education and income are highly correlated with the outcomes of children 
along the same dimensions (see e.g. Solon 1999). As a starting point, we therefore split the sample by 
birth cohort and further divide it into three groups based on the highest educational attainment of the 
parents: compulsory school (grades 1-7), middle school (grades 8-10), and higher education (11 or 
more years of education). Next, we partition the sample according to an indicator for urbanity, equal to 
one if the individual was born in one of the five bigger cities of Norway (Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, 
Stavanger, Drammen). The idea is that urbanity may proxy for neighbourhood effects, which may 
arise from varying local resource bases, such as availability of institutions like schools and childcare, 
as well as through social interaction in peer-groups, like attitudes and preference formation as well as 
the existence and enforcement of social norms.17 Finally, we partition the sample according to an 
indicator for being raised in a large family, equal to one if the individual has two or more siblings. 
Drawing on the quantity-quality model of Becker and Lewis (1973), a large body of empirical research 
has shown a fairly strong association between number of siblings and children’s outcome. In 
particular, it appears to be substantial negative effects of large sibship size (see Mogstad and Wiswall, 
2010). Thus, to measure EOp, the sample is divided into 36 mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive types based on circumstances. Within each type, we will allow for 100 tranches, that is, 
quantiles in the type-specific income distributions.   
Ideally, we would have liked to use more information on family background to define the set 
of individual circumstances. However, the Norwegian register data is quite limited when it comes to 
family background of individuals born almost sixty years ago. Furthermore, our sample size restricts 
us for having more types, as we need a sufficient number of observations to identify the tranche of 
each type. Yet as a robustness check, we have replaced the grouping based on the highest educational 
attainment of the parents with a grouping based on fathers’ earnings in 1960. Specifically, the 
individuals are divided into three groups of equal size based on the distribution of fathers’ earnings: 33 
percentile and below, 33-66 percentile, and 66 percentile and above. The data on fathers’ earnings is 
collected from the 1960 census. We find that the estimated measures of inequality and social welfare 
change very little when using fathers’ income instead of parental education to define the set of 
individual circumstances.18 
 
Descriptive statistics. Table 1 displays the composition of the sample according to the variables used 
to define circumstances. We see that about 20 percent of the sample was born in urban areas, and 
about 45 percent come from a large family. Moreover, it is evident that about 53 percent has parents 
with only compulsory schooling, almost 30 percent has at least one parent who attended middle 
                                                 
17 Raaum et al. (2006) show significant effects of childhood neighbourhood on children’s long-run outcomes.   
18 The results are available on request.  
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school, and less than 18 percent has at least one parent with higher education. It is further evident that 
the composition is fairly similar across cohorts.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Birth cohort 
 42 43 44 42-44 
Income (NOK)     
Period-specific income:     
1967-1968 157,338 150,824 141,850 149,191 
1975-1976 240,324 239,477 233,859 237,538 
1985-1986 244,191 244,085 239,967 242,518 
1995-1996 277,150 283,057 279,302 279,926 
2005-2006 311,261 329,562 328,496 323,958 
Mean income (1967-2006) 251,824 258,005 249,505 252,955 
Permanent income (1967-2006) 234,976 237,163 230,058 233,787 
     
Circumstances (populaton shares)     
Urban 18.18 20.09 21.06 19.92 
Large family 46.02 44.51 43.69 44.62 
Parental Education     
Comp. school only 53.48 52.59 51.39 52.38 
Middle school 29.00 29.39 30.67 29.77 
Higher education 17.52 18.02 17.95 17.85 
Sample size 7,399 8,572 10,119 26,090 
Note: Period-specific income is defined as the average income over the two-year period. 
 
Figure 1. Marginal distribution of permanent income for entire sample and by parental 
education 
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Notes: The distribution denoted entire sample includes the incomes of all individuals. The distributions denoted Higher education, Middle 
school and Compulsory school are graphed separately by parental education for the sub-sample of individuals from the 1944 cohort who 
were born in an urban area and living in a small family. 
 
Table 1 also shows that the income of these cohorts increase over time. In particular, the period-
specific incomes are, on average, lower than the mean income over the period 1967-2006 up until the 
early 1990s. It is also clear that the long-term mean income exceeds the permanent income measure, as 
only the latter takes into the costs of inter-period income transfers. As expected, the income of the 
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older cohort are relatively high during the first years as they have more labor market experience, but 
are surpassed by the younger cohorts when they grow older. The mean and the permanent income are 
rather similar across cohorts. Figure 1 graphs the cumulative distribution of permanent income for the 
sample as a whole, and for different types according to parental education. As expected, permanent 
income is increasing in parent’s education.   
 
Equality of outcome. 
Figure 2 graphs the time-trend in inequality according to the EO principle based on period-specific 
(two years) income (cf. Period-specific, EO), and compare it to the EO measure of inequality based on 
permanent income (cf. Permanent, EO.) We see that inequality is fairly stable during the 1970s when 
the individuals are their mid 30s, with a Gini-coefficient ranging from .18 to .20.  After this point in 
time, inequality is increasing steadily, almost doubling as the individuals reach the peak of the age-
earnings profile.19 In contrast, the Gini coefficient in permanent income is as low as .17, which 
suggests substantial income mobility. Moreover, our results indicate that snapshots of inequality based 
on income early in the working lifespan may provide a reasonable approximation of inequality in 
permanent income when the EO principle is employed. The intuition is that individuals with high 
permanent income tend to be those with high income growth. 
 
Figure 2. Gini-inequality according to EO and ex-post EOp based on period-specific 
income and permanent income 
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Notes: The ex-post EOp Gini measure of inequality is defined by (3.12). 
                                                 
19 A possible explanation is that the age-earnings profile differs systematically across individuals, with relatively high 
earnings growth among individuals with high education. Another explanation is that skill-biased technical change has led to 
increased earnings inequality. Investigating these two explanations is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Figure 3 reports the time-trend in social welfare according to the EO principle based on period-specific 
income (cf. Period-specific, EO), and compares it to EO measure of inequality in permanent income 
(cf. Permanent, EO). We see social welfare is increasing substantially during the 1970s, as mean 
incomes rise and inequality is stable. Over the next decade, social welfare declines as the welfare loss 
from increased inequality dominates the increase in mean incomes. During the economic boom in the 
1990s, social welfare increased once again owing to a large increase in mean incomes, despite 
substantially higher income inequality. We also see that social welfare in permanent income mirrors 
social welfare in period-specific inequality fairly well when the individuals are between 30 and 50 
years of age, in contrast to the inequality results.  
 
Figure 3. Social welfare according to EO and ex-post EOp based on period-specific 
income and permanent income 
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Note: The ex-post EOp social welfare measure is defined by (3.6), with the ex-post EOp Gini measure as the inequality index.  
  
Equality of opportunity. 
Turning attention to our ex-post measures of EOp, Figure 2 shows the trend in inequality based on 
period-specific income (cf. period-specific, ex-post EOp) and compares it to inequality in permanent 
income (cf. permanent, ex-post EOp). We see that opportunity inequality is fairly stable until 
individuals reach their early 40s, with ex-post EOp Gini less than .05. After this point in time, the ex-
post EOp Gini increases steadily, almost doubling as individuals reach the end of the working lifespan. 
In contrast, the ex-post EOp Gini in permanent income is slightly lower than .05, which suggests that 
groups viewed as (dis)advantaged based on snapshots of income regularly change position over time. 
Figure 4 breaks down the ex-post EOp Gini into the different percentile-specific Gini coefficients. We 
see that inequality is remarkably stable across the percentiles. In particular, the percentile-specific Gini 
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coefficients vary between .04 and .06 for quantiles located between the 3rd and 85th percentile, and 
somewhat higher at the tails of the distribution. Another interesting finding in Figure 2 is that 
snapshots of inequality based on income early in the working lifespan may provide a reasonable 
approximation of inequality in permanent income, also when the EOp principle is employed. This 
implies that outcome inequality increases over the life cycle among individuals who have exerted the 
same degree of effort.  
 
Figure 4. Percentile-specific Gini-inequality according to ex-post EOp based on 
permanent income 
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
0,14
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97
Percentiles
G
in
i
Permanent, Ex-post EOp
 
Note: The percentile-specific ex-post EOp measure is given by (3.4), with the ex-post EOp Gini measure as the inequality index. 
Figure 2 also demonstrates that the ex-post EOp measures of inequality are much smaller than the 
corresponding EO measures. As shown in equation (3.15), we can interpret the difference between the 
EO measure of inequality and the ex-post EOp measure of inequality as inequality due to effort. 
Specifically, our findings suggest that opportunity inequality makes up about 28 percent of inequality 
in outcome when the analysis is based on permanent income and between 23 and 26 percent when the 
period-specific incomes form the basis. However, the time trend in inequality according to the ex-post 
EOp Gini is quite similar to that produced by the EO Gini. This implies that the life-cycle pattern in 
outcome inequality among individuals who have exerted the same degree of effort, is much like the 
life-cycle pattern in outcome inequality in the population as a whole.  
Figure 3 reports social welfare measures according to the ex-post EOp principle based on 
period-specific income (cf. period-specific, EOp) and permanent income (cf. permanent, EOp). 
Compared to the EO results, social welfare is considerably higher when the ex-post EOp principle 
forms the basis for the analysis, owing to lower inequality. Specifically, the ex-post EOp measure of 
social welfare in permanent income is almost 15 percent higher than the EO measure. Yet the time 
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trend in social welfare based on period-specific incomes is quite similar across the two measures.  In 
particular, we see that the ex-post EOp measure of social welfare based on snapshots of income during 
the period the individuals are between 30 and 50 years of age are fairly similar to the corresponding 
measures based on permanent income. 
Figure 5. Gini-inequality according to ex-ante and ex-post EOp based on period-specific 
income and permanent income 
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Notes: The ex-post and ex ante EOp Gini are defined by (3.12) and (3.18). 
 
Figure 6. Difference in social welfare according to ex-ante and ex-post EOp based on 
period-specific income and permanent income 
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Notes: The ex-post and ex ante EOp social welfare measures are defined by (3.6) and (3.20), using the Gini measure as the inequality index. 
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Figure 5 compares the ex-ante and the ex-post EOp measures of inequality. The ex ante long term 
measure is slightly higher than the ex post long term measure. We also see that the period-specific 
measures show a common trend. In particular, for the first 25 years ex post inequality of opportunity 
dominates the  ex-ante measures, while the situation is reversed for the latest 15 years of the working 
lifespan. While the ex ante measures are focused on the inequality between social types, the ex post 
measures are able to capture in a finer way the individual income gaps due to circumstances. 
Therefore, these results indicate that the distance between social groups, as defined by the 
circumstances, become increasingly important, relatively to the individual differences, in the last part 
of the working lifespan. Figure 6 graphs the difference in social welfare according to the ex-ante and 
ex-post EOp measures. These results mirror well the similarity in inequality across the two types of 
EOp measures.  
 
Life-cycle variation in the association between current and lifetime income  
We wrap up this empirical analysis with a comparison between our results and those produced by the 
literature on life-cycle variation in the association between current and lifetime income. In the 
pioneering studies by Haider and Solon (2006) and and Bohlmark and Lindquist (2006), they analyze 
life-cycle variation in the association between current and permanent or lifetime income, to evaluate 
the appropriateness of the textbook errors-in-variables model. They find that it does not accurately 
characterize current income as a proxy for lifetime income. In particular, the slope coefficient in a 
regression of log current income on log lifetime income is not generally equal to one, as the textbook-
errors-in-variablese model assumes, varying instead systematically over the life cycle. An important 
implication is that using current income as a proxy for lifetime income can generate substantial life-
cycle bias in regression analysis. 
Along the same lines, we have estimated the slope coefficient in a regression of current 
income in year t, Yit, on permanent income, Zi, which is given by: 
 
(4.1)   it it
i
cov(Y ,Z )
var( Z )
λ = . 
 
As in Haider and Solon (2006) and Bohlmark and Lindquist (2006),  λt starts out at a value less than 
one at the outset of the career, then increases over the life cycle, and exceeds one later in the career. At 
the age when λt equals 1, one may use current income as a proxy for permanent or lifetime income 
without generating life cycle bias in regression analysis. In our data set, λt is approximately equal to 1 
around age 50.20  
                                                 
20 In comparison, Haider and Solon (2006) find that λt comes close to 1 when individuals are in their early 40s (and mid 30s), 
whereas Bohlmark and Lindquist (2006) report that λt is approximately 1 when individuals are aged 46-53 (and around age 
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However, this finding does not justify using current income at age 50 as a proxy for lifetime 
income in the measurement of inequality. To see this, note the life-cycle variation in the association 
between the Gini coefficient in current and permanent income can be expressed as: 
 
(4.2)   it it i it it i
it i
2cov[Y ,F(Y )] 2cov[Z ,F(Z )] = G(Y ) - G(Z ) = 
E(Y ) E(Z ) 
δ − . 
 
In general, λt = 1 does not imply that δt = 1 (or vice versa). The reason is that the δt depends on the 
covariance between individuals' incomes and their ranks in the distributions of current and permanent 
income, whereas λt simply depends on the covariance between individuals current and permanent 
income. As shown in Figure 2, δt is minimized when individuals are in their mid 30s, and later (earlier) 
in individuals’ working lifespan, current income inequality overstates (understates) the extent of 
permanent income inequality. This illustrates that that life-cycle variation in the association between 
inequality in the distributions of current and lifetime income is a separate issue from life-cycle 
variation in the association between levels of current and lifetime income.  
5 Summary and conclusion 
 
More than half a century ago, Friedman (1957, p38) argued that “the identification of low measured 
income with 'poor' and high measured income with 'rich' is justified only if measured income can be 
regarded as an estimate of expected income over a lifetime or a large fraction thereof". His concern 
was that studies based on fluctuating annual incomes may provide a misleading picture of the 
consumption possibilities of individuals, and consequently, also the extent of inequality and social 
welfare in a society. Instead, methods used for distributional analysis should reflect that income can 
be, and regularly is, used for consumption not only within the year that it is obtained, but also in other 
years.  
Since Friedman’s work, a large and growing literature has addressed the question: what 
exactly should be equalized? Egalitarian theories of justice, especially after Sen’s (1980, 
1985, 1992) pioneering work, emphasize individuals’ responsibility in determining their own 
well-being. Following this literature, economists have explored different ways of evaluating 
income distributions according to the EOp principle. However, snapshots of income still form the 
basis of EOp analyses. 
The aim of this paper is to introduce and apply a general framework for evaluating long-term 
income distributions according to the EOp principle. The proposed framework is valid for measuring 
short-term or long-term EOp, depending on whether we let snapshots of income or permanent income 
                                                                                                                                                        
33). It should be noted, however, that these two studies measure income in logs rather than levels. When measuring income 
in logs, our estimate of λt is equal to 1 around age 40. 
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form the basis. Further, it allows for both an ex-ante and an ex-post approach to EOp. There is long-
term ex-post inequality of opportunity if individuals who exert the same effort have different 
permanent incomes. In comparison, the ex-ante approach focuses on the expected permanent income 
for groups of individuals with identical circumstances.  
To demonstrate the empirical relevance of a long-run perspective on EOp, we have used a 
unique panel data from Norway on individuals’ incomes over their working lifespan. The insights 
from our empirical results may be summarized with three conclusions. First, EOp measures of 
inequality are less than one third of the corresponding EO measures, suggesting that a large fraction of 
inequality of outcomes is attributable to initial circumstances. This is true both when permanent 
income and snapshots of income form the basis for the analysis. Hence, social welfare is much higher 
according to the EOp principle than the EO principle. Second, snapshots of income overstate 
inequality compared to analysis based on permanent income, suggesting substantial income mobility. 
However, our results indicate that snapshots of inequality based on income early in the working 
lifespan may provide a reasonable approximation of inequality in permanent income; in comparison, 
social welfare measures based on snapshots of income during the period the individuals are between 
30 and 50 are fairly similar to the corresponding measures based on permanent income. This is true 
both when the EO and the EOp principle form the basis for the analysis. Third, we find some 
similarity between ex-ante and ex-post EOp measures of inequality and social welfare. This holds both 
for permanent income and the time-trend in period-specific income, except for the latest 15 years of 
the working lifespan.    
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